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JANICE M. MUELLER*

Facilitating Patient Access to Patent-Protected
Genetic Testing
In March 2010, a New York federal district court granted summary
judgment invalidating a number of biotechnology patents directed to the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 human breast cancer genes.1 One of the most highly
publicized patent disputes in recent memory, Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology (AMP) v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
and Myriad Genetics, Inc. (hereinafter Myriad)2 pits patient care advocates
against the patent-owning biotechnology industry.3 The Myriad decision is
now under review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which will likely reverse the district court and confirm the patent-eligibility
of the claimed isolated genes.4
© 2011 Janice M. Mueller.
*
Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; Visiting Professor, spring 2010,
University of Kentucky College of Law. I thank Professor Lawrence Sung, Professor Patricia
Campbell, and the staff of the University of Maryland School of Law Journal of Business &
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Genetic Disease Diagnosis and Treatment: Do Patents Matter?” I welcome comments by e-mail to
mueller2@pitt.edu.
1. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (as amended Apr. 5, 2010) (“[T]he
challenged patent claims are directed to (1) isolated DNA containing all or portions of the BRCA1
and BRCA2 gene sequence and (2) methods for ‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ BRCA1 [sic] and
BRCA2 gene sequences to identify the presence of mutations correlating with a predisposition to
breast or ovarian cancer.”).
2. Id.
3. See Timothy Caulfield, Human Gene Patents: Proof or Problems?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
133, 139–40 (2009) (discussing “social trade-off inherent in the patent system” in the
biotechnology context and public concern over patient access to clinically useful technologies).
4. The Federal Circuit has previously upheld the validity of gene patents. See, e.g., In re
Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See also In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). These decisions applied
qualitative patentability criteria such as nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and disclosure
compliance under 35 U.S.C. § 112. However, the Federal Circuit has not previously confronted a
Myriad-type challenge to the patent-eligibility of gene patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, most likely
because § 101 qualification was taken as a given by the parties and not raised as an issue on
appeal in the court’s earlier cases.
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Neither the Federal Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court should prohibit
the patenting of genetic material through judicial decision;5 such a drastic
change in patent law requires due deliberation by Congress.6 Despite the
critical importance to society of facilitating patient access to genetic testing,
dismantling patent protection for this important technology is not the right
approach; instead, modifying approaches to licensing gene patents is.7
Since the 1980s, the USPTO has granted more than 20,000 patents
claiming isolated DNA molecules, almost 4,000 of which claim isolated
human DNA encoding proteins.8 Based on the likelihood that the USPTO
will continue its past practice of granting such patents, a Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Advisory Committee extensively
studied patient access concerns stemming from restrictive licensing of some
gene patents.9 Rather than eliminating the grant of such patents, the
Committee has proposed that patient access be facilitated through statutory
exemptions from patent infringement liability.10 Specifically, the proposed
exemptions would allow unlicensed use of gene patents for research and
diagnostic, but not therapeutic, purposes.11
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See Remarks of David Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, BIO International Convention
(May 3–6, 2010), available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/05/04/kappos-talks-patentreform-and-gene-patents-at-bio-convention/id=10382/ (May 4, 2010). See also Statement of Q.
Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property & Director of the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (July 13, 2000), at 3:
Over the past twenty years, many patent applications have been filed that are drawn to
subject matter relating to genes. The filing rate of applications relating to genes has
dramatically increased in the past few years. Currently, over 20,000 applications
relating to genes are pending before the USPTO. Since the first gene related
applications were filed, approximately 6,000 patents have issued which are drawn to
full-length genes from human, animal, plant, bacterial and viral sources. Of these 6,000
patents, over 1,000 are specifically drawn to human genes and human gene variations
that distinguish individuals.
9. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON
PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS Report], available at
http://oba.od nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf.
10. SACGHS Report, supra note 9, at 94.
11. See id. at 97. The Committee calls the proposed exemption from infringement liability for
gene-based diagnostic testing a “narrowly tailored exemption [permitting] the holders of patents
on genes to continue to enforce their exclusive rights to therapeutic uses of the claimed molecules,
thereby preserving the incentive such patents create for the development of therapeutics” and
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I support the Committee’s proposed scheme, but suggest that it be
modified to provide remuneration to the patent owner in the case of
diagnostic use. In Part I of this essay, I explore the district court’s decision
in Myriad and conclude that it should not stand.12 In Part II, I describe the
HHS Advisory Committee’s recommendations for facilitating access to
patented genetic testing and offer a modification of the Committee’s
proposed framework.13
I. The District Court’s Summary Judgment Opinion in Myriad

The patents challenged by AMP, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), and other plaintiffs claimed both breast cancer gene-related
products and processes.14 The March 29, 2010 decision of the Southern
District of New York, authored by Judge Robert W. Sweet, invalidated both
types of claims.15 This essay focuses exclusively on the debate concerning
the patent-eligibility of the product (i.e., composition of matter) claims,
setting aside the question of the process claims’ patent-eligibility under the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos.16
Judge Sweet’s discussion of the product claims in Myriad began in a
promising vein, citing Judge Giles Rich’s classic guidance in In re Bergy17
asserts that the proposed exemption for research on or with genes “is designed to permit research
that can generate insights into disease, genetic tests, and therapeutics.” Id.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he sole task of this Court is to resolve
whether the claimed compositions and methods constitute statutory subject matter or fall within
the judicially created products of nature exception to patentable subject matter.”).
15. Id. at 232 (holding composition claims invalid); id. at 237 (holding method claims
invalid).
16. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). The Court in Bilski held that patent
application claims to a method of fixing commodity costs by hedging weather and market risks
were not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claims were drawn to an
“abstract idea.” The facts of Bilski did not involve composition of matter (or other product)
claims, and it would Seem illogical to characterize a tangible, isolated DNA sequence as an
abstract idea.
Nevertheless, one judge of the Federal Circuit has raised Bilski's potential applicability to
the Myriad dispute by writing that “[j]ust as the patentability of abstract ideas would preempt
others from using ideas that are in the public domain . . ., so too would allowing the patenting of
naturally occurring substances preempt the use by others of substances that should be freely
available to the public.” Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., No. 2009-1568, slip op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
4, 2010) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (describing “three doors” to obtaining a patent); id. at
960–61 (stating that “the questions of whether a particular invention is novel or useful are
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011

85

F P A  P-P G T

that 35 U.S.C. § 101 statutory (i.e., patent-eligible) subject matter issues
must be distinguished from § 102 (novelty) and § 103 (nonobviousness)
issues.18 But the district court took a wrong turn when it interpreted Bergy’s
guidance to distinguish away the leading purified products of nature
decision, Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,19 as involving merely
novelty rather than statutory subject matter issues.20

questions wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject
matter”).
18. Id. at 960 (discussing the need for “separate keys to open in succession the three doors of
sections 101, 102 and 103”). All statutory references herein are to sections of the U.S. Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C. (2010).
19. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). Judge
Sweet’s Myriad opinion recalls his own appearance as a government lawyer before Judge Hand.
Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 225 n.46 (stating that “[a]lthough Judge Hand once turned his back on
the author of this opinion arguing before him on behalf of the Government, his opinion in ParkeDavis deserves careful review but brings to mind that oft repeated adage ‘Quote Learned, but
follow Gus’”) (citing James Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second
Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 387, 389 n.17 (1995)).
20. Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis considered whether the claimed
composition (isolated adrenalin) was a patentable “composition of matter,” stating:
Nor is the patent only for a degree of purity, and therefore not for a new “composition
of matter.” As I have already shown, it does not include a salt, and no one had ever
isolated a substance which was not in salt form, and which was anything like
Takamine’s. Indeed, Sadtler supposes it to exist as a natural salt, and that the base was
an original production of Takamine’s. That was a distinction not in degree, but in kind.
But, even if it were merely an extracted product without change, there is no rule that
such products are not patentable. Takamine was the first to make it available for any
use by removing it from the other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of
course possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every
practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically. That was a good
ground for a patent.
Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103. See also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156,
160–62 (4th Cir. 1958) (sustaining § 101 validity of composition claims to “[vitamin] B(12)active compositions derived from . . . specified fermentates” against challenge that claims recited
unpatentable “products of nature,” and citing Parke-Davis as illustrating principle that “where the
requirements of the [Patent] Act [(i.e., novelty, utility, and nonobviousness)] are met, patents upon
products of nature are granted and their validity sustained”).
Judge Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis is recognized as the foundational case for the
patent-eligibility of purified and isolated products of nature, which differ from their corresponding
natural products “not merely in degree of purity, but in degree of kind.” Lauren Nowierski, A
Defense of Patenting Human Gene Sequences Under U.S. Law: Support for the Patenting of
Isolated and Purified Substances, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 473, 483 (2008) (analyzing
Parke-Davis and observing that “[t]he jurisprudence that developed following Parke-Davis
primarily relied on Judge Hand’s decision to support the patentability of extracted, isolated, and
purified ‘products of nature’ that meet the other statutory requirements of patentability”). See also
1-1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[9] (2010) (commenting that “there is a long
line of cases that hold that mere purification of known materials does not result in a patentable
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The district court’s opinion went further astray by placing unjustified
reliance on two inapposite Supreme Court decisions from the 1930s/1940s,
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.21 and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co.22 Both of these decisions are off point, for they dealt
with novelty or nonobviousness (earlier expressed as an elusive requirement
for “invention”) rather than patentable subject matter issues.23 American
Fruit Growers inexplicably relied on 19th century tariff cases to decide what
is a patentable “manufacture” under the Patent Act.24
Turning to more pertinent Supreme Court precedent from 1980,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,25 the Myriad district court extracted a single
phrase: that the bacteria genetically engineered by Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty
possessed “markedly different characteristics” than those found in nature.26
Judge Sweet elevated that three-word description to the test for qualifying
product,” but citing Parke-Davis as recognizing an exception to the purity rule when “the new
pure compound differs ‘in kind’ rather than merely ‘in degree’ from the old compound”).
21. 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (invalidating patent claiming fresh fruit having rind impregnated
with borax to provide mold resistance on ground was not a patentable “article of manufacture”).
The American Fruit Growers Court asserted, without citation to authority, that
[a]ddition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material
an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property. The
added substance only protects the natural article against deterioration by inhibiting
development of extraneous spores upon the rind. There is no change in the name,
appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the
same beneficial uses as theretofore.” Id. at 11–12. Scholars have observed that “[t]he
presence or absence of a ‘new or distinctive form, quality or property’ is an issue
properly relevant to the statutory standards of novelty and nonobviousness.
See CHISUM, supra note 20, at § 1.02[3][a].
22. 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) (invalidating patent claiming mixture of mutually non-inhibitive
strains of bacteria that advantageously helped various legume plants extract nitrogen on ground of
invention or discovery). The Funk Bros. Court opined that “[e]ven though [the claimed
discovery] may have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the product of invention.” Id.
The Funk Bros. decision is “perhaps best viewed as an interpretation of the nonobviousness or
‘invention’ requirement.” See CHISUM, supra note 20, at § 1.02[7][b].
23. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing novelty, nonobviousness and
requirements for “invention” under the Patent Act).
24. Am. Fruit Growers, Inc., 283 U.S. at 12 (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609,
613, 615 (1887)) (finding that there was no patentable “manufacture” of shells on grounds that
there was no transformation “into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character,
or use from that of a shell”).
25. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
26. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(as amended Apr. 5, 2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310) (contrasting the bacterium at
issue with the bacterial mixture at issue in Funk Bros., stating “the patentee has produced a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the
potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own . . . .”).
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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an isolated genetic product under § 101, stating that “[t]he question thus
presented by Plaintiffs’ challenge to the composition claims is whether the
isolated DNA claimed by Myriad possesses ‘markedly different
characteristics’ from a product of nature.”27 Judge Sweet found that it did
not.28
The Myriad district court’s opinion misinterpreted Chakrabarty.29 The
primary focus of Chakrabarty was not on the degree of difference between
Chakrabarty’s genetically engineered bacterium and bacillus bacteria as
they existed in nature.30 Rather, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
latter were nature’s handiwork, while the former would not have existed but
for Chakrabarty’s intervention and ingenuity in manipulating the DNA.31
Accordingly, the § 101 analysis for gene patents should focus on who or
what (i.e., whether human or nature) produced the claimed subject matter.32
The “degree of difference” question speaks to novelty under § 102 and/or
nonobviousness under § 103.
Myriad filed its notice of appeal in the Federal Circuit in June 2010,33
but the gene patenting controversy crystallized by the Myriad litigation
27. Id. at 227–28.
28. Id. at 229.
In light of DNA’s unique qualities as a physical embodiment of information, none of
the structural and functional differences cited by Myriad between native BRCA1/2
DNA and the isolated BRCA1/2 DNA claimed in the patents-in-suit render the claimed
DNA ‘markedly different.’ This conclusion is driven by the overriding importance of
DNA’s nucleotide sequence to both its natural biological function as well as the utility
associated with DNA in its isolated form. The preservation of this defining
characteristic of DNA in its native and isolated forms mandates the conclusion that the
challenged composition claims are directed to unpatentable products of nature.
Id.
29. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
30. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10 (comparing genetically engineered bacterium to
bacteria that existed in nature and holding the former patentable subject matter as “a product of
human ingenuity”).
31. Id.
[Chakrabarty’s] claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of
human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use. . . .
[Chakrabarty] has produced a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for
significant utility. His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own;
accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.
Id.
32. See generally U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
33. Myriad Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad,
S.D.N.Y. (June 16, 2010) (No. 4515).
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could well continue beyond the Federal Circuit’s review.34 Judge Sweet
invited Supreme Court interest by quoting Justice Breyer’s dissent from the
dismissal of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc.,35 that “sometimes too much patent protection can
impede, rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts . . . .’”36 Because the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bilski was
limited on its facts to the patentability of process or method claims under §
101 and did not (at least directly) address the patentability of composition
of matter claims,37 the legitimacy of patenting so-called purified products
of nature (such as isolated and purified genetic material) remains an issue
ripe for Supreme Court adjudication.38
If the Court granted certiorari in Myriad, the Justices would
undoubtedly consider carefully the guidance of their expansive 1980
decision in Chakrabarty, which held that genetic material removed from its
native state (in that case, in the form of a genetically modified bacterium)
was statutory subject matter under § 101.39 The Court’s more recent
holding in J.E.M. Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc.
would also be relevant.40 The Court in J.E.M. held that plants are

34. See John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Cancer Genes Cannot be Patented, U.S. Judge
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at B0 (stating that Myriad could have far-reaching implications
impacting the future of medicine). See also Marisa Noelle Pins, Impeding Access to Quality
Patient Care and Patient Rights: How Myriad Genetics’ Gene Patents are Unknowingly Killing
Cancer Patients and How to Calm the Ripple Effect, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 377, 396 (2010)
(“Several lawyers expect the ruling to be overturned, or at the very least ‘an important Supreme
Court showdown’ to ensure [sic].”).
35. 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari).
36. Id. at 126 (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
37. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“The present case involves an invention
that is claimed to be a ‘process’ under § 101.”); Id. at 3221 (“The machine-or-transformation test .
. . is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”); Id. at 3222
(rejecting Bilski’s patent application under Court’s precedents on the unpatentability of “abstract
ideas” and declining to further define “what constitutes a patentable ‘process’”).
38. Cf. Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., No. 2009-1568, slip op. at 3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2010)
(Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has
directly decided the issue of the patentability of isolated DNA molecules. Although we have
upheld the validity of several gene patents . . . none of our cases directly addresses the question of
whether such patents encompass patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office . . . believes that at least some of these patents satisfy section
101 . . . thus far the question has evaded judicial review.”).
39. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that respondent’s
genetically modified bacterium qualified as patentable subject matter).
40. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
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potentially protectable under § 101 utility patents,41 despite the fact that
alternative forms of protection are also available under the plant-specific
statutes (i.e., the Plant Patent Act of 193042 and the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970).43 Notably, the J.E.M. Court relied on Chakrabarty in
“declin[ing] to narrow the reach of § 101 where Congress has given us no
indication that it intends this result,”44 and described § 101 as “a dynamic
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.”45
If it were to consider Myriad, the Supreme Court would also need to
weigh the significant reliance interests of gene patent owners.46 Such
interests are far more vested than those of business method patent holders.
The USPTO has issued thousands of patents on isolated genetic material
since the 1980s,47 pre-dating any significant trend toward patenting
business methods.48 The agency’s position is that isolated and purified
genetic sequences are potentially patentable.49 More than thirty years after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the U.S. Congress has not
acted to legislatively overrule the Court’s holding that genetically
engineered life forms are patent-eligible under § 101.50 In the meantime,

41. Id. at 127.
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (2006).
43. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2582 (2006).
44. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 145–46.
45. Id. at 135.
46. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y 2010)
(noting that the case’s resolution “deeply concern[s],” inter alia, patent holders). See also Roger
D. Klein, & Maurice J. Mahoney, Labcorp v. Metabolite Laboratories: The Supreme Court
Listens, but Declines to Speak, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 147 (2008) (noting Myriad has placed
great reliance on gene-related patent protection).
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
48. The Federal Circuit’s 1998 State Street Bank case is generally considered to be the
decision that opened the door to the filing of large numbers of business method patent applications
in the USPTO. State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
49. USPTO, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“[A]n
inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition isolated
from its natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other
molecules naturally associated with it.”).
50. See Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 477 (2003) (noting that Congress has not overruled
Chakrabarty’s holding).
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the U.S. biotech industry has become the world’s leader; the availability of
patent protection has undoubtedly contributed to this success.51
The § 101 statutory subject matter inquiry should not be used as a
blunt instrument to cabin patenting of isolated genetic material.52 Other
provisions of the Patent Act, as interpreted in recent Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit decisions, already act as difficult (if not insurmountable)
qualitative obstacles to obtaining patents on isolated genetic material.53 For
example, the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex54 is widely
viewed as having raised the bar for satisfying the § 103 requirement of
nonobviousness across all technologies.55 Interpreting KSR in the genetic
context, the Federal Circuit’s 2009 decision in In re Kubin56 signaled that
“classical” biotechnology inventions (i.e., claims to isolated genes that
encode particular proteins) may now be routinely characterized as “obvious
to try” in the KSR sense, and hence obvious under § 103.57

51. See Lila Fei, The Role of the Private Sector in Biotechnology: Research and
Development, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 357, 363–64 (2002) (noting that patent protection is critical for
the biotech industry’s large profits).
52. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (refusing to
consider excluding isolated genetic material from patentability). See also Julian David Forman,
Case Comment, A Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnology Patent
Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 659 (2002) (noting that “[s]ubject matter does not
Seem like a particularly useful doctrinal tool for evaluating biotechnology patents”).
53. See, e.g., KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (forbidding
patenting when the claimed invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in the art); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (recognizing significant “obviousness”
hurdle for gene patents); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that a
patentable invention must meet a standard of substantial utility).
54. KSR, 550 U.S. at 398.
55. See R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets v. Patents: The New Calculus, 2 No. 6 LANDSLIDE
10, 2 (2010) (noting that KSR decision is illustrative of trend towards more restrictions on
patents); Rubin L. McGrath et. al, Recent Developments in Patent Law and its Impact on Patent
Litigation, 948 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 95, 112 (2008) (“[O]bviousness standards that have been
distilled from KSR appear to have given patent challengers a diverse arsenal from which to attack
patents.”). See generally Janice M. Mueller, Chemicals, Combinations, and “Common Sense”:
How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision is Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness
Determinations in Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cases, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 281, 281 (2008)
(examining KSR’s substantial impact on an already complicated § 103 nonobviousness analysis).
56. 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
57. See id. (affirming USPTO Board’s conclusion that claimed genus of isolated nucleic acid
molecules encoding Natural Killer Cell Activation Inducing Ligand (NAIL) protein would have
been obvious in view of prior art teachings of the NAIL protein and a detailed methodology for
cloning genes, with motivation to isolate the claimed NAIL cDNA arising from the importance of
NAIL’s role in human immune response).
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,58 confirmed that satisfying the
written description of the invention requirement under § 112, ¶ 1 is
particularly onerous for biotechnological genus claims where few species
have been actually reduced to practice. This results regardless of whether a
person having ordinary skill in the art (the “PHOSITA”) would have been
enabled to make and use the entirety of the genus.59 Ariad also enshrined as
en banc law that the written description requirement applies to all claims,
including originally-filed claims, and not merely those added or amended
after filing,60 contrary to earlier understandings of the requirement as
limited to priority policing.61
The utility requirement of § 101 is yet another qualitative hurdle to
patenting gene-based inventions.62 The Federal Circuit held in In re
Fisher63 that a claimed genetic sequence, part of a larger underlying gene
for which no overall structure or function had been established as of the
patent’s filing date, did not satisfy the utility requirement of § 101.64
The cumulative impact of decisions such as KSR, Kubin, Ariad, and
Fisher means that gene patents are increasingly difficult to obtain.65 Those
patents already in force may now be at heightened risk of invalidation under

58. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
59. Id. at 1345 (stating that “a separate requirement to describe one’s invention is basic to
patent law . . . . The specification must . . . describe how to make and use the invention (i.e.,
enable it), but that is a different task”).
60. Id. at 1351 (stating that “[n]either the statute nor legal precedent limits the written
description requirement to cases of priority or distinguishes between original and amended
claims”).
61. Cf. Id. at 1350 (disagreeing with Ariad Pharmaceutical’s contention that court’s decision
in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), “constituted a
change in the law, imposing new requirements on biotechnology inventions”). See also Janice M.
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 615 (1998) (asserting that “[t]he [Regents v. Eli] Lilly
decision may profoundly limit the scope of protection available for new gene inventions . . . [and]
represents the latest advance in an ominous trend towards imposition of uniquely heightened
patentability requirements for biotechnological inventions.”).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092,
1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (noting that § 101 requires patent application to disclose the invention’s
utility); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A]n application must disclose a use
which is not so vague as to be meaningless.”).
63. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
64. See id. at 1373, 1379.
65. See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); Ariad Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d
1351, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379.
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these new rules.66 The inherent ambiguity of § 101’s broadly-phrased
categories of patent-eligible subject matter need not be invoked when
qualitative doctrines such as nonobviousness, utility, and the disclosure
requirements have been much further developed and more finely tuned to
deal with gene-based inventions.67
II. Providing Enhanced Patient Access to Genetic Diagnostic Testing
Without Eliminating Patent Rights

Public concern should be redirected from the granting of gene patents
themselves, which will likely continue despite Judge Sweet’s decision, to
greater focus on the restrictive licensing practices applied to some of these
patents. Myriad illustrates such practices.68
Defendant Myriad is the sole U.S. source of full BRAC testing,69 for
which the company reportedly charges about $3,200.70 Myriad, a for-profit
corporation, derives 80% of its revenues from its proprietary
BRACAnalysis® testing, which it characterizes as “the standard of care in
identification of individuals with hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.”71
Not all insurance plans are accepted.72 Importantly, there is no place for a
patient to get a second opinion on the genetic testing; no sharing of samples

66. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406 (forbidding patenting when the claimed invention would have
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350 (requiring
adequate written description); Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1360 (recognizing significant “obviousness”
hurdle for gene patents); Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373 (stating that claimed genetic sequences must
provide specific, immediate, “real world” benefits).
67. Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1087, 1091–92 (2007) (noting that nonobviousness, utility, and adequate description are more
practical avenues than § 101 for analyzing patentability of software-related inventions).
68. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y 2010)
(providing example of restrictive licensing of BRCA1/2 gene testing technology).
69. See id. at 189 (stating that “Myriad is . . . the current exclusive licensee of the patents-insuit [and] is the sole provider of full sequencing of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in the United States
on a commercial basis”) (citing Myriad Answer ¶ 28).
70. Sixty Minutes: Patented Genes (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 4, 2010), http://
www.cbs.com/primetime/60_minutes/video/?pid=DzbFbHN8QAJrs44sVo6h4pHFfblUQfpD.
71. Marketed Products, MYRIAD GENETICS, INC. (2009), http://www myriad.com/products/
(describing BRACAnalysis®).
72. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 204 (stating that “[c]urrently, 90% of
the tests Myriad performs are covered by insurance at over 90% of the test cost”) (citing
Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 32, 33, 52, 53). See also Complaint at 10, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad, 2009 WL 1343027, May 12, 2009 [hereinafter Complaint] (asserting at paragraph 21 that
Myriad will not accept insurance coverage from MassHealth, “a Medicaid insurance program for
low-income people”).
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is permitted to ensure quality of testing.73 Women with the BRCA1/2
mutation may be making life-altering decisions about whether to have
prophylactic mastectomies or hysterectomies without the back stop of a
second test run by an entity other than Myriad.74 This state of affairs, as
alleged in the ACLU’s complaint, is simply not acceptable.75 However,
placing all the blame on the granting of gene patents is not acceptable,
either.
Although District Judge Sweet has ruled (and many have argued) that
the U.S. government should completely prohibit the patenting of isolated
genes,76 there are compelling reasons to reject this extreme approach.77
Rather than prohibit gene patenting, an alternative strategy aimed at the
problem of patient access to patented genetic testing resources would place
carefully drawn limits on a patentee’s ability to enforce its exclusivity in
certain circumstances.78 This alternative strategy would involve either an
outright exemption from liability for patent infringement, or at least some
form of mandatory nonexclusive licensing with remuneration to the
patentee.79
Many scholars have advocated a statutory exemption in U.S. patent
law from infringement liability when researchers use patented materials for
non-commercial purposes such as research and experimentation—a sort of

73. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 207 (citations to declarations omitted)
(stating that “[p]laintiffs contend that as a result of the patents-in-suit, BRCA1/2 genetic testing is
one of the very few tests performed as part of breast cancer care and prevention for which a doctor
or patient cannot get a second confirmatory test done through another laboratory. . . . In particular,
women who receive a positive result cannot confirm the lab’s findings or Seek a second opinion
on the interpretation of those results”); Complaint, supra note 72, at 27 (asserting at paragraph 90
that “[b]ecause of its patents on the BRCA genes, Myriad has the power to bar patients from
obtaining testing other than through its laboratory. There are women . . . who have obtained full
sequencing from Myriad, who cannot obtain a second opinion on their BRCA testing and are
compelled to make major medical decisions based on a test that they cannot confirm.”).
74. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 207; Complaint, supra note 72, at 27.
75. See Complaint, supra note 72, at 27 (asserting that women are forced into making major
medical decisions without being able to seek a second opinion).
76. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 237 (concluding that “the patents
issued by the USPTO are directed to a law of nature and were therefore improperly granted”). See
also Allen K. Yu, Why it Might be Time to Eliminate Genomic Patents, Together With the Natural
Extracts Doctrine Supporting Such Patents, 47 IDEA 659, 666–73 (2007) (examining the multiple
arguments against the patenting of isolated genes).
77. See supra Part I.
78. See supra Part II.
79. See supra Part II.
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“fair use” doctrine for patent law.80 Most other countries around the world
(including most industrialized countries and the world’s leading patent
systems—Germany, Japan, and the U.K.) have long included a research use
exemption in their domestic patent laws.81 These patent systems have not
fallen apart because of the exemption, nor has innovation in these countries
stopped.82
A standard objection to any proposed type of liability exemption is
that it would lessen the economic value of patents by reducing their
exclusionary power.83 This in turn would reduce the incentives to invent
that patent protection offers.84 The economic objection should not lightly be
brushed aside. Any proposal to alter the patent law liability framework has
to be carefully thought out and narrowly defined.85 Vested property rights
and expectations are at stake.86 So as not to unduly disrupt those reliance
80. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent
Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for
University and Non-Profit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Maureen
A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000);
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004).
81. For example, Germany’s patent law provides that “[t]he effects of a patent shall not
extend to . . . acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented
invention.” German Patent Act § 11.2 (1980), amended by the Laws of July 16 and August 6,
1998, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/de/de081en html. Japan’s statutes
provide that “[t]he effects of a patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent right for
the purposes of experiment or research.” Japan Patent Law § 69(1), Law No. 121 of 1959,
amended by Law No. 220 of 1999, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_
new/en/jp/jp036en html. The United Kingdom (U.K.) patent law provides that “[a]n act which,
apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an invention shall not
do so if—(a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not commercial; [or] (b) it is done for
experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention.” Patents Act, c. 37, § 60(5)
(1977) (Eng.), available at http:// www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/gb/gb001en html.
82. See Kimberly M. Thomas, Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research: Creating a
Compulsory Licensing Provision in Wake of an Absent Experimental Use Exception, 7 LOY. L. &
TECH. ANN. 97, 108, 111–16 (2007) (observing the patent systems of foreign countries that
employ statutory exemptions).
83. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599,
631–32 (Spring 2009); Jordan P. Karp, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The
Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2180 (1991).
84. See Karp, supra note 83 (“[A] broad experimental use exception, by discouraging
inventors from relying on the patent system, would . . . reduce innovative activity in those
industries that rely on patent protection.”).
85. Mueller, supra note 80, at 919.
86. Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct
Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 284 (2008).
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interests, legislators should consider implementing any liability exemption
(or compulsory licensing scheme) in a prospective-only manner.87
Although a prospective implementation would not necessarily address the
immediate problem of access to the patented BRCA1/2 genes, a prospective
change in the law would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s caution
against unfairly discounting the expectations of patent owners who obtained
their patents under a different set of rules.88
An Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society (hereinafter
“SACHGS”) provides guidance to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius on a
“broad range of policy issues raised by the development and use of genetic
technologies [including] the impact of gene patents and licensing practices
on access to genetic testing.”89 The 18-person committee includes a crosssection of notable experts from public sector health departments, private
sector genetics companies, health care foundations, academia (medical and
legal),90 and attorneys in private practice.91 In April 2010, the SACGHS
issued its final report concerning gene patents and licensing practices and
their impact on patient access to genetic tests.92 Committee members
compiled numerous case studies (including the Myriad dispute), consulted
with experts, and surveyed the literature on gene patenting.93

87. See generally Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of
Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1301 (2001) (recognizing the importance of advance notice
in the context of compulsory licensing).
88. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002) (stating that fundamental alterations in rules risk the legitimate expectations inventors hold
in their property); Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6
(1997) (stating that changing the rules would “subvert the various balances the PTO sought to
strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected
by our decision”); id. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (warning that a new presumption might
“unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the time of patent
prosecution that such a presumption would apply”).
89. SACGHS Report, supra note 9.
90. Leading patent law scholar Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss of NYU Law is a SACGHS
member. Id. at i.
91. Id. at ii.
92. See SACGHS Report, supra note 9. An earlier draft was published in February 2010. See
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., REVISED DRAFT REPORT ON GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (Feb. 5, 2010), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/SACGHS%20Patents%20Report%20Approved%202-520010.pdf.
93. See SACGHS Report, supra note 9 (stating the Committee’s report is “based on evidence
gathered through a literature review and original case studies of genetic testing for 10 clinical
conditions as well as consultations with experts and a consideration of public perspectives”). The

96

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

J M. M

The SACGHS report makes a number of important recommendations,
but notably does not recommend that gene patents be eliminated.94 Rather,
the Committee recommends that the U.S. patent statutes be amended to
create certain limited exemptions from liability for infringing gene patent
claims.95 The proposed exemptions would apply in two situations: (1)
making, using, or selling a test developed under a gene patent for “patientcare purposes”;96 and (2) using patented genes in the pursuit of research.97
The Committee believes its recommendation for statutory exemption from
liability is “the most expeditious and straightforward way of addressing the
identified problems and promoting patient access to emerging genetic
advances.”98
The SACGHS report describes the Committee’s first proposed liability
exemption, which would apply when patented genetic tests are offered for
“patient-care” (i.e., diagnostic) purposes, as a “narrowly tailored” activity.99
In contrast, “therapeutic uses” of patented genes (e.g., gene transfer to treat
a genetic disease or disorder) would not be exempted or shielded.100
case studies were prepared by the Duke University Center for Genome Ethics, Law & Policy. Id.
at A-1–51.
94. See id. at 97–100 (detailing Recommendations 1–6); id. at 11 (explaining that report does
not explore questions about the legitimacy of granting patents on human genes or the morality of
doing so . . . ”). While not calling for any broad elimination of gene patents, the Committee does,
however,
urge[] the Secretary to use current authority to discourage the seeking, the granting,
and the invoking of any patents on simple associations between a genotype and
a phenotype,” because such association patent claims “threaten the availability of
existing genetic tests and are an anticipated barrier to the development of testing
innovations, such as microarrays and whole-genome sequencing.
Id. at 97.
95. Id. (“Recommendation 1: Support the Creation of Exemptions from Infringement
Liability”).
96. Id. (proposing in Recommendation 1(A) “[t]he creation of an exemption from liability for
infringement of patent claims on genes for anyone making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or
selling a test developed under the patent for patient-care purposes.”).
97. Id. (proposing in Recommendation 1(B) “[t]he creation of an exemption from patent
infringement liability for those who use patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research.”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (“This narrowly tailored exemption [allowing service providers to offer gene-based
diagnostic testing for patient-care purposes] permits the holders of patents on genes to continue to
enforce their exclusive rights to therapeutic uses of the claimed molecules, thereby preserving the
incentive such patents create for the development of therapeutics. Moreover, by preserving the
right to patent genes and enforce those patents for therapeutic applications, this exemption
maintains the strong incentive patents create for privately funded basic genetic research, which is
often ultimately driven by the hope of developing a therapeutic.”).
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However, the protected (i.e., non-infringing) activity would include making,
using, selling, or offering for sale, a test developed under a gene patent.101
This first proposed recommendation appears to contemplate complete
exemption from liability, meaning that there would be no act of
infringement and no remuneration due to the patentee, analogous to the
operation of fair use in copyright law.102 The proposed liability exemption
would apply to both non-commercial and commercial laboratories.103 The
committee does not consider remuneration for patient-care purposes to be
necessary, because the continued enforceability of gene patents against
therapeutic uses would be sufficient to preserve incentives for the
development of gene based therapeutics.104
It is difficult to know, ex ante, whether the Committee’s prediction is
correct. If commercial genetic testing laboratories are earning profits
through the sale of testing services that involve making and/or using
patented genes, I contend that some reasonable royalty based on those
profit-generating sales ought to flow back to the patentee. The royalty must
be set ex ante at a reasonable level so as to protect patients from excessively
high pricing by the laboratories.
One way to structure this remuneration would be to implement a
mandatory licensing scheme for gene patents.105 The notion of mandatory,
government-compelled, or “compulsory” licensing of patents has long been
anathema in the U.S., but many other industrialized countries (not only
developing countries such as India, Thailand, and Brazil) include
compulsory licensing provisions in their domestic patent statutes.106 The

101. Id.
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (stating that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an
infringement of copyright”); SACGHS Report, supra note 9, at 97 (proposing “an exemption from
patent infringement liability for those who use patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research”).
103. SACGHS Report, supra note 9, at 97.
104. Id. (stating that “[t]his narrowly tailored exemption [allowing service providers to offer
gene-based diagnostic testing for patient-care purposes] permits the holders of patents on genes to
continue to enforce their exclusive rights to therapeutic uses of the claimed molecules, thereby
preserving the incentive such patents create for the development of therapeutics. Moreover, by
preserving the right to patent genes and enforce those patents for therapeutic applications, this
exemption maintains the strong incentive patents create for privately funded basic genetic
research, which is often ultimately driven by the hope of developing a therapeutic”)
105. See Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny
and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403, 412 (2005).
106. See, e.g., German Patent Law Act §§ 81–85 (1980), amended by the laws of July 16 and
August 6, 1998 (providing for compulsory license proceedings), available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text_pdf.jsp?lang=EN&id=1035 (last visited Aug. 10, 2010). See also
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Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement permit this.107 In practice,
compulsory licensing provisions are very rarely invoked.108 Rather,
voluntary negotiation over patent licenses proceeds in the shadow of the
statutory compulsory licensing provisions.109 The threat of compulsory
licensing encourages patentees to license more widely and on more
reasonable terms.110 This type of implicit motivation might go far to solve
the problem of restrictive licensing practices by some U.S. gene patent
holders.
To the rare extent that compulsory patent licensing provisions are
actually invoked by applicants for a license, the involvement of government
bureaucracy is triggered to determine whether to grant a license, and if so,
what its terms should be. The machinery of compulsory licensing
disadvantageously displaces bargaining from the marketplace, creates
potential delays, requires that the patentee be given due process rights to
challenge the government’s compulsory licensing decision and terms, and
so on.
Another alternative (really just a variant of compulsory licensing) is
called a “license of right” scheme.111 Certain categories of patents, to be
Yosick, supra note 87, at 1277, 1284 (discussing the U.S.’s hostility towards compulsory
licensing).
107. See, e.g., German Patent Law Act §§ 81–85 (1980), amended by the laws of July 16 and
August 6, 1998 (providing for compulsory license proceedings), available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text_pdf.jsp?lang=EN&id=1035 (last visited Aug. 10, 2010). See also
Yosick, supra note 87, at 1277, 1284 (discussing the U.S.’s hostility towards compulsory
licensing).
108. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting that
“[c]ompulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system”); Samuel Mark Borowski, Saving
Tomorrow from Today: Preserving Innovation in the Face of Compulsory Licensing, 36 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 275, 282 (Winter 2009).
109. See Borowski, supra note 108, at 300 n.187 (noting that the value of compulsory licenses
is “the inducement of the patentee to agree to reasonable terms”).
110. Id.; Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 781 (2010)
(noting the success of South Africa and Brazil in reducing prices charged by pharmaceutical
companies on drugs under patent by using the threat of compulsory licensing); Kimberly M.
Thomas, Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research: Creating a Compulsory Licensing
Provision in Wake of an Absent Experimental Use Exception, 7 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 97, 108
(2007) (discussing instances where inventors threatened with compulsory licensing have come to
agreements with patent holders to avoid litigation).
111. For example, India’s patent laws formerly incorporated a “license of right” for all process
patents pertaining to substances capable of being used as medicines or foods. See The Patents
Act, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE § 87 (1970) (titled “Certain patents deemed to be endorsed with
the words ‘Licenses of right,’”), available at http://indiacode nic.in. The United Kingdom’s patent
laws currently provide that a patent owner may apply to register its patents as available for
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determined by the legislature (such as gene patents), would automatically
be made available for licensing to all comers for a pre-set statutory royalty
rate (that is, some percentage or per-unit amount of the sales made by forprofit testing facilities that provide genetic testing using a patented
gene).112 The concept is not very different from the mechanical license in
copyright law, which the U.S. has recognized for years to benefit musical
work copyright holders.113 Postponing the implementation of a license of
right scheme until a few years of exclusivity have elapsed, rather than
immediately after a gene patent issues, would enhance patentee incentives
and be consistent with Paris Convention principles.114
Lastly, courts can act to facilitate patient access to patented genetic
testing materials even if Congress chooses not to. In the post-eBay
landscape we now inhabit,115 mandated licensing for a limited category of
uses of patented genes should no longer shock or inflame the patent-owning
community. Although it seemed virtually impossible ten years ago, U.S.
courts in 2010 are denying permanent injunctions against adjudicated
infringers and permitting them to continue infringing uses, manufacturing,
and sales, in exchange for payment of “ongoing royalties.”116 If courts can
licensing as of right. See Patents Act, §§ 46–47 (1977) (as consolidated 2010) (Eng.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text_pdf.jsp?lang=EN&id=1623.
112. See Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use
and Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 167 n.187 (2008) (discussing statutory licenses where statutes
set notification procedures and royalties).
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (titled “Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical
works: Compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords”). See also 2 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.04[A] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.,
2010) (describing the historical basis of the mechanical compulsory license of nondramatic
musical works in the 1909 Copyright Act).
114. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5.A.(4), opened for
signature Mar. 20, 1883, as amended Sept. 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/export
/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf (providing that “[a] compulsory license
may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the
expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years
from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the
patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons”).
115. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that a
permanent injunction is not to be automatically awarded in every case in which a patent is found
infringed and its validity sustained; a district court’s decision to impose or deny permanent
injunction in a patent case should be made only after consideration of traditional equitable
principles generally applicable to all types of cases).
116. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (accepting in
principle the district court’s award of “ongoing royalty” of $25 per infringing vehicle that Toyota
would sell during remaining life of Paice LLC’s patent on certain hybrid drive train technology,
but remanding case to district court for an explanation of how it had arrived at the $25/car ongoing
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fashion such remedies in cases of infringed patents covering, e.g.,
automotive technology,117 then it is all the more appropriate that they
consider doing so in cases involving public health and welfare. The
message of eBay is that patent rights, like other types of property rights, can
no longer be understood to convey an absolute right to exclude others.

royalty); id. at 1314 (observing that awarding an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction may be
appropriate under some circumstances, including patent infringement).
117. See id. at 1315.
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